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The Description of Collateral
in Security Agreements and

Financing Statements
By Joseph J. Beard*

"What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet."
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,

Romeo and Juliet

Perhaps the Bard of Avon was correct in his assertion that misdescription of a rose dims its fragrance not one whit; but a misdescription in a
security agreement or financing statement may have the most profound
consequences, mostly unpleasant, for the "secured" party. The purpose of
this article is to explore what constitutes an adequate description of collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code and the judicial decisions interpreting the description requirements of the Code. The discussion is organized by type of collateral as defined in Article 9: inventory, accounts receivable, equipment and consumer goods, as well as an all-encompassing discussion of "serial-number" cases.]
U.C.C. §9-203 provides that, unless a pledge is involved, the debtor must
sign a security agreement "which contains a description of the collateral,"
and if perfection is to be by way of filing, §9-402 states that the financing
statement must contain "a statement indicating the types, or describing
the items, of collateral." There arises the question of how detailed or precise the description of collateral must be in security agreements or financing statements. In answer, the drafters of the Code provided in §9-110 that
"[flor purposes of this Article any description of personal property or real
estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies
what is described." In the official comment to § 9-110, the drafters said
that "the test of sufficiency of a description . . . is that the description do
the job assigned it-that it make possible the identification of the thing
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law. Tufts University (B.S., 1956); Suffolk
University (J.D., 1969); Babson College (M.B.A., 1971); Boston University (LL.M. 1974).
Member of the Massachusetts Bar.
1. Chattel paper, instruments, contract rights (where the 1972 revision has not been
adopted), general intangibles and accessions do not appear to have engendered significant,
if any, litigation under the Code on the question of description, and therefore will not be
considered here.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

described." They went on to urge the courts to "refuse to follow the holdings, often found in the older chattel mortgage cases, that descriptions are
insufficient unless they are of the most exact and detailed nature, the socalled 'serial number' test."
To what extent have courts heeded the exhortations of the drafters? The
decisions discussed in the following paragraphs should provide some insight to the answer.
INVENTORY

The description-or misdescription-of inventory has been the subject
of a significant amount of litigation. One question that has arisen is
whether the word "inventory" in a security agreement or financing statement is sufficient or whether it is necessary to describe the items comprising the inventory. A second question is whether the word "inventory"
describes only the inventory on hand at the moment the agreement is
executed or whether it encompasses items of inventory subsequently acquired. With respect to the question of whether the word "inventory" was
too vague to be an adequate description in a security agreement, an early
Pennsylvania Code decision held that "to require enumeration of all types
of articles handled would be unreasonably burdensome and neither within
the letter nor the spirit of the Code."' In Security Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Hlass,3 the court, while holding that the trial court erred in holding as a
matter of law that "inventory" was inadequate as a description, appeared
to suggest that the "better practice" was to describe the collateral by types
or items.
In Donald v. Madison Industries, Inc.,' the court, in upholding the sufficiency of the word "inventory" as a description, said that "it is readily
apparent that the U.C.C. does not require but instead rejects the degree
of specificity which the government suggests is necessary." 5
In Biggins v. Southwest Bank,' the phrase "sales and service of new and
used automobiles" was found to be the equivalent of the word "inventory"
and was held to be a sufficient description in a financing statement. And
in Borg-WarnerAcceptance Corp. v. FirstNational Bank,' it was held that
the word "inventory" in a security agreement was sufficient to include not
only the inventory financed by the secured party but other inventory as
2. Thomson v. O.M. Scott Credit Corp., 1 UCC REP. SERV. 555, 559, 10 Ches. Co. L. Rep.
405, 28 Pa. D&C2d 85 (1962). Other decisions holding the word "inventory" as sufficient
include In re Little Brick Shirt House, 347 F. Supp. 827, 10 UCC REP. SERv. 1360 (N.D. Ill.
1972); In re Goodfriend, 2 UCC REP. SFR~v. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
3. 441 S.W.2d 91, 6 UCC REP. SERv. 736 (Ark. 1969).
4. 483 F.2d 837, 13 UCC REP. SERv. 918 (10th Cir. 1973).
5. Id. at 843, 13 UCC REP. SERV. at 924-25.
6. 332 F. Supp. 62, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1319 (S.D. Cal. 1971), afl'd, 490 F.2d 1304, 13 UCC
REP. SERv. 928 (9th Cir. 1973).
7. 238 N.W.2d 612, 18 UCC REP. SERv. 526 (Minn. 1976).
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well. Thus, Security Tire notwithstanding, it appears there is general
agreement that the word "inventory," without more, is a sufficient description of collateral both in security agreements and financing statements. At
least it is a sufficient description of inventory existing at the time the
documents are executed. There remains the question whether the word
"inventory" is sufficient to include not only inventory on hand at the time
the agreements and financing statements are signed but subsequently acquired inventory as well.
Two schools of judicial thought can be found on the concept embodied
in the word "inventory." By way of analogy, the two schools might be
described as the still picture, or photograph, theory on the one hand, and
the motion picture theory on the other. Under the still picture concept,
inventory is only that which is present when the security agreement is
signed, i.e. inventory that would be photographed at a given time. Under
what I call the motion picture theory, inventory encompasses all items that
come into the possession of the debtor; whether on hand on the day the
agreement is signed or subsequently acquired. This concept embodies the
changing identity, or makeup, of what a debtor holds for resale as shelf
items are sold and replaced.
In In re Taylored Products Co.,' the court said that the phrase "afteracquired property" was not necessary in a financing statement, "[slince
it was contemplated that security interest might be created after the filing
of the financing statement, any addition of the words 'after acquired property' would be redundant,'" but the court went on to hold that the failure
to include an after-acquired-property clause in the security agreement
limited an interest in "inventory" to that inventory on hand at the time
the security agreement was executed. In In re Fiberglass Boat Corp.,'0
however, the court took a different and, I believe, correct view of what the
word "inventory" encompasses. The court held, despite the absence of an
after-acquired-property clause, that a security agreement describing the
collateral as "inventory" created a lien on inventory acquired after the
agreement was made:
However, the property secured in this case is inventory, goods held for
sale and goods consumed in the business. Inventory by its nature and
definition changes from day to day. . . . Surely the creditor would not
enter into a financing arrangement secured by collateral fixed on a particular date, when the collateral by its nature would be constantly changing.
It would be straining the normal meaning of the word to find that inventory meant only that on hand on the particular day the contract was
8. 5 UCC REP. SERV. 286 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
9. Id. at 288-89. See also In re Wilson, 13 UCC REP. SERV. 1195 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Evans
Prods. Co. v. Jorgensen, 421 P.2d 978, 3 UCC REP. SERV. 1099 (Ore. 1966).
10. 324 F. Supp. 1054, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 118 (S.D. Fla.), afid, 448 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.

1971).
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executed, and if a can of paint or the like were used, the collateral would
be diminished to that extent. Certainly the parties contemplated that the
inventory would be sold or used and replaced; that is what inventory
means.!'
In In re Page,' the court said:
The bankrupt was engaged in a mercantile business selling these inventory items at retail. Needless to say, any reasonable secured party would
be fully aware that this type of business presupposes a constant change
in the inventory. Therefore, it is obviously unreasonable to assume that
anyone would have received or acquired or intended to acquire a security
interest in an inventory with the rigid limitation that it should be limited
to the same items
which made up the inventory on the date the document
3
was executed.'

Declaiming that "[i]nventory is like a river, the water in which constantly flows, rises and falls, but which always constitutes a river," the
court in In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc. '1 held that when a security
agreement describes collateral as "inventory," the agreement automatically covers after-acquired inventory unless it clearly sets out that only
certain items of inventory are to be covered.
There does not appear to be any disagreement that the use of the word
"inventory" in financing statements is sufficient to give notice that afteracquired inventory may be included. Even though the weight of opinion
may be that "inventory" in a security agreement is sufficient to encompass
after-acquired inventory, and even though as a semantic argument
"inventory" should be a fluid and not static concept, the wise draftsman
should include an after-acquired-property clause along with "inventory"
to avoid the necessity of convincing a given court of its ever-changing
nature.
ACCOUNTS
"Accounts" have provided a source of litigation in which the issues are
quite similar to those discussed when "inventory" was involved. One issue
litigated was whether the use of the phrase "accounts receivable" was
sufficient to secure an interest in an isolated account unrelated to the
11. Id. at 1056, 9 UCC REP. SERV. at 120. See also In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478, 3 UCC
REP. SERV. 719 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Bank of Utica v. Smith Richfield Springs, Inc., 58 Misc.2d
113, 294 N.Y.S.2d 797, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 1197 (1968); In re Goodfriend, 2 UCC REp. SErv.
160 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
12. 16 UCC REP. SEarv. 501 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
13. Id. at 504. For similar language see Owen v. McKesson & Robbins Drug Co., 349 F.
Supp. 1327, 11 UCC REP. SERV. 455 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
14. 329 F. Supp. 93, 96, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 886, 890 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 56, 9 UCC
REP. SERV. 1266 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827 (1st
Cir. 1951).

19771

DESCRIPTION OF COLLATERAL

normal business transactions of the debtor. The district court in In re
Varney Wood Products,Inc. 1 held that the phrase "accounts receivable"
was narrower than the term "accounts," which it said encompassed
"accounts receivable" as a sub-species. Accordingly, the court found that
a financing statement describing collateral as "accounts receivable" was
inadequate to capture an isolated transaction wholly outside of the
debtor's normal business dealings. On appeal, however, the reviewing
court, reversing the findings of the lower court, held that "accounts receivable" in a financing statement was sufficient to put an interested party on
inquiry and adequately covered the isolated account."6
A fairly recent New York decision came to a different conclusion. It held
that the phrase "accounts receivable" did not cover an isolated transaction
wholly outside normal business dealings. 7 But this decision cited with
favor the lower-court decision of Varney Wood Products, which had already been reversed. It appears, although the decisions under the Code are
not numerous, that the term "account" and the phrase "accounts receivable" are interchangeable.
With respect to inventory, the question was whether the word encompassed after-acquired inventory; the same question has been asked with
respect to accounts receivable. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided
that a description in a financing statement of collateral as "all present and
future accounts receivable" was sufficient to cover future accounts receivable. 8 The court concluded: "It is difficult under the circumstances to imagine how the description could be more complete without filing new and
amended descriptions each time a new account receivable falls within the
purview of the financing statement. Nowhere in the Uniform Commercial
Code is such requirement set forth."' 9 While this decision did not go so far
as to suggest that the term "accounts receivable" encompassed future
accounts, it did establish a foundation on which to build.
The court in In re Platt,10 moving a step further, held that the absence
of the word "future" before the words "accounts receivable" did not preclude a financing statement from giving effective warning that afteracquired accounts were subject to the security agreement. The court said:
15. 327 F. Supp. 425, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 172 (W.D. Va. 1971).
16. 458 F.2d 435, 10 UCC REP. SERV. 513 (4th Cir. 1972). To the same effect see Bramble
Transp., Inc. v. Sam Senter Sales, Inc., 294 A.2d 104, 10 UCC REP. SERV. 939 (Del. 1972);
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith, 501 P.2d 639, 11 UCC REP. SERV. 647 (Nev. 1972). For a
discussion of the definition of "account" see Matthews v. Arctic Tire, Inc., 262 A.2d 831, 7
UCC REP. SERV. 369 (R.I. 1970).
17. In re Empire Metal Cap Co., 17 UCC REP. SERV. 1108 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings County
1975).
18. Industrial Packaging Prods. Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, Inc., 161 A.2d 19, 1 UCC
REP. SERV. 634 (Pa. 1960).
19. Id. at 21, 1 UCC REP. SERV. at 638.
20. 257 F. Supp. 478, 3 UCC REP. SEav. 719 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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The addition of the words "future" to "accounts receivable and inventory" would not seem to help an interested party in determining the status
of a debtor. .

.

. No reasonable searcher of the records would conclude

that the secured party had a lien on only the past accounts and inventory
of the debtor, especially where the debtor is in an active retailing business.2'
The court in South County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Bituminous Pavers
Co." also held that a financing statement describing collateral as
"accounts receivable" was sufficient to include future accounts receivable.
The security agreement in that case, however, expressly included accounts
receivable arising later.
The question remained whether a security agreement would be adequate
to cover after-acquired accounts if the agreement merely referred to
"accounts." The court'in In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co. 3 held
that the failure to include an after-acquired property clause in a security
agreement precludes a security interest in subsequent accounts. The court
said:
[Ilt is neither onerous nor unreasonable to require a security agreement
to make clear its intended collateral. .

.

. The general prohibition in pre-

Code law on including after-acquired property as collateral heightens the
sense of such a rule because, commercial practice of including afteracquired property notwithstanding, a subsequent lender might expect the
parties to make explicit an intention to include this kind of property, both
for precision
and because the law's historic hostility to such arrange2
ments. '

In a strong dissent, Chief Judge Seitz said:
Financing of inventories and of accounts receivable has for years been
the particular province of the "floating lien." Fluid financing arrangements in these areas are obviously necessary because the nature of
specific inventory items or accounts is likely to vary daily, although the
total value of a business inventory or accounts may remain reasonably
stable for long periods. It would, thus, be commercially reasonable to
anticipate, unless the financing statement indicated otherwise,21 that security interests in inventory or accounts would include after-acquired
property,
even though the presumption would be reversed for other prop26
erty.

While I agree with the reasoning of the dissent in Middle Atlantic, cau21. Id. at 481, 3 UCC REP. SERV. at 722.
22. 256 A.2d 514, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 901 (R.I. 1969).
23. 503 F.2d 1133, 14 UCC REP. SERV. 1233 (3rd Cir. 1974).
24. Id. at 1136, 14 UCC REP. SERV. 1236.
25. See In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 93, 96 (1971).
26. 503 F.2d at 1137, 14 UCC REP. SEaV. at 1237.
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tion dictates that the security agreement include an after-acquired property clause if an interest in subsequently acquired accounts is desired.
With respect to financing statements, the weight of opinion seems to find
the after-acquired property clause unnecessary. Heights v. Citizens National Bank 7 considered the other side of the coin-whether a financing
statement filed in 1967 could be held to describe pre-1967 accounts. The
court held that it did.
EQUIPMENT

How detailed a description of "goods used in a business" must be was
addressed by the court in National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co.',
The court held that a security agreement that provided an interest in "all
contents of a luncheonette including equipment such as . . ." was sufficient to cover a cash register even though "cash register" was not one of
the items in the illustrations following the words "such as." 2 9 The court
also held that a financing statement need not mention after-acquired property, since only "notice filing" is required by the Code.3 0
A financing statement that described collateral as "equipment" was
sufficient to put creditors on notice as to a truck used in the debtor's
business." However, a description of collateral as "equipment" in a
security agreement was held not to cover automobiles; in fact, the court
in In re Laminated Veneers, Inc.32 held that even the generic term
"automobile" might not be an adequate description. But Galleon Industries, Inc. v. Lewyn Machinery Co."3 held that the term "equipment" in a
security agreement was sufficient to include a machine used by the debtor
in its business.
The holding in Laminated Veneers might have been interpreted as negating the use of the word "equipment" as an effective description in
security agreements, at least in the Second Circuit, but in In re Sarex
27. 342 A.2d 738, 17 UCC REP. SERV. 337 (Pa. 1975).
28. 191 N.E.2d 471, 1 UCC REP. SERv. 460 (Mass. 1963).
29. Id. at 473, 1 UCC REP. SERV. at 463. Accord, Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Blaze Oil
Co., 463 P.2d 495, 7 UCC REP. SERV. 126 (Wyo. 1970); Hillman's Equipment, Inc. v. Central
Realty, Inc., 242 N.E.2d 522, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 1160 (Ind. 1968). But see Mammoth Cave
Prod. Cred. Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26, 5 UCC REP. SERv 11 (Ky. 1968).
30. Accord, American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 473 P.2d
234, 7 UCC REP. SERV. 1097 (Okla. 1970).
31. In re Bloomingdale Milling Co., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 256 (W.D. Mich. 1966). Accord,
Goodall Rubber Co. v. Mews Ready Mix Corp., 7 UCC REP, SERV. 1358 (Wis. Cir. Ct., 1970);
Stephens v. Bank of Camilla, 133 Ga. App. 210, 210 S.E.2d 358, 16 UCC REP. SE~v. 265
(1974). But c. Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 13 UCC REP. SERv. 355. (S.D.
Ohio 1973).
32. 8 UCC REP. SERV. 602 (E.D. N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 471 F.2d 1124, 11 UCC REP. SERv. 911
(2d Cir. 1973). Accord, Long Island Trust Co. v. Porta Aluminum Corp., 14 UCC REP. SERV.
833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
33. 279 So. 2d 137, 12 UCC REP. SERv. 1224 (Ala. App. 1973).
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Corp.,3' the Second Circuit held that "machinery and equipment" was
sufficient in a security agreement to encompass non-enumerated items of
machinery and equipment. The court appears to have limited Laminated
Veneer to its facts, i.e. automobiles.
The limits of vagueness seem to have been reached in In re Lockwood
IndustrialLeasing Corp. v. Sabetta.35 The court held that a description of
"all tangible personal property" was too general to be an effective description of collateral in a security agreement (though the court concluded that
the document in issue was in fact a true lease rather than a lease intended
for security). The sufficiency of the term "equipment" in financing statements does not appear to be seriously challenged. Its use in security agreements without further amplification, at least by way of illustration, is a
matter of some risk. Language such as "all equipment including but not
limited to" may provide the best of both worlds: specificity about identifiable items and sufficient generality about items not then specifically in the
minds of the parties.
CONSUMER GOODS

Security interests in consumer goods create special problems because of
the superior bargaining power of the commercial creditor and the lack of
business sophistication on the part of the consumer debtor. Without the
watchfulness of the judiciary, the unwary consumer might find the chattel
mortgage extending to personal property that he never intended to be
encumbered. "Equipment," although a generic term, was held to be sufficient in a financing statement if not in a security agreement (a point in
dispute). What of the generic term "consumer goods," as defined in U.C.C.
§9-109? If items have been enumerated, the courts appear to have little
difficulty in finding adequacy of description: "2 pc living room suite, wine;
5 pc chrome dinette set, yellow; 3 pc panel bedroom suite, lime oak, matt
& spgs;"' and "household goods, furnishings, electrical appliances, radio
and television receiving sets. '37 However, if the only description is
"consumer goods," issue is joined.
The court in In re Trumble38 held that, against a trustee in bankruptcy,
"consumer goods" as a description of collateral in a financing statement
was sufficient to perfect an interest in unenumerated items held for personal use. Yet in In re Bell, 3, against the trustee in bankruptcy, "consumer
goods" was held to be an inadequate description in a financing statement:
34. 509 F.2d 689, 16 UCC REP. SERv. 497 (2d Cir. 1975).
35. 16 UCC REP. SERV. 195 (D. Conn. 1974). But see James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l
Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775, 10 UCC REP. SERV. 11 (Minn. 1972), in which "all goods" was
sufficient to create a security interest in equipment.
36. In re Drane, 202 F. Supp. 221, 1 UCC REP. SERV. 436 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
37. In re Wilson, 13 UCC REP. SEav. 1195 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
38. 5 UCC REP. SERv. 543 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
39. 6 UCC REP. SERv. 740 (D. Colo. 1969).
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[T]he words "consumer goods" used as descriptive in a financ ing state-

ment do not serve to indicate types or items of property. .

.

. It necessar-

ily follows that a financing statement which recites that the types or items
of property to be covered are "consumer goods" is without any certain
meaning and actually
conveys no meaning so far as identifying types or
40
items is concerned.
If the interest competing with the secured party is that of the trustee in
bankruptcy, the courts seem divided over the adequacy of "consumer
goods" as a description. If the contrast is between the debtor and the
secured party, one would expect agreements and financing statements to
be construed, if doubt exits, in favor of the consumer."
FARM PRODUCTS

Security interests in farming operation have created their own brand of
problems. For ease of discussion, this section includes farm products, farm
equipment, and livestock (an inclusion which I hope will not initiate a
dispute between farmers and cattlemen).
A description of collateral in a security agreement and financing statement as "seven acres of cotton to be produced on the lands of S.E. Karnes"
was held to be inadequate because it did not clearly indicate whether the
debtor grew only seven acres or whether anyone else was growing cotton
on Karnes' land. 42 When "all the crops" grown on described land were
included in the description, the financing statement was held adequate in
United States v. Big Z Warehouse.3 In Chanute Production Credit Ass'n
v. Weir Grain Supply, Inc.,'4 although "all the crops" was included in the
financing statement, a description of the real estate as "land owned or
leased by the debtor in Cherokee County, Kansas" was insufficient to
perfect a security interest in the crops. When a financing statement and
security agreement described in detail three parcels of land on which crops
were grown but omitted any description of three other parcels of land, the
40. Id. at 742. Accord, In re Lehner, 303 F. Supp. 317, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 1023 (D. Colo.
1969) (stating that the term "consumer goods" failed to reveal the types of collateral), afJ'd,
427 F.2d 357, 7 UCC REP. SERv. 1055 (10th Cir. 1970); In re Woods, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 116
(D. Kan. 1971). "All of the consumer goods, including but not limited to furniture, appliances
and other household goods and personal property of all kinds and description now or hereafter
located at debtor's address shown above" was held sufficient in In re Turnage, 493 F.2d 505,
14 UCC REP. SERV. 1051 (5th Cir. 1974).
41. Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 815, 18 UCC REP. SERv. 1056 (7th
Cir. 1976). "All of the consumer goods of every kind now owned or hereafter located in or
about the place of residence of the Debtors" was held to be misleading to the consumer
debtor.
42.. Piggott State Bank v. Pollard Gin Co., 419 S.W.2d 120, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 785 (Ark.
1967).
43. 311 F. Supp. 283, 7 UCC REP. SEar. 1061 (S.D. Ga. 1970).
44. 499 P.2d 517, 10 UCC REP. SERV. 1351 (Kan. 1972).
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security interest was unenforceable against crops on the undescribed parcels, despite language that all crops grown anywhere in certain counties
were to be the subject of the security interest. 5 An Oklahoma lower-court
decision" that "all crops for the 1967 Season" was sufficient and that
omission of the description of the real estate was a "minor error" was
quickly reversed in First National Bank v. Calvin Pickle Co.47
Farm equipment is not distinguished in §9-109 from other equipment,
so one might suspect similar judicial treatment. A description in a security
agreement and a financing statement of collateral as "all farm equipment"
and "all property similar to that listed above" was held to be too indefinite
in Mammoth Cave Production Credit Ass'n v. York.4" When a financing
statement described collateral as "all farm machinery and equipment,
including but not limited to tractors, tanks, tilling and harvesting tools,"
it was held adequate to describe a tractor but, curiously enough, it was not
adequate to describe a fertilizer distributor, disc tillers, or spray rig. 9
Delaware took a most liberal view and held that a financing statement was
adequate to cover specific farm equipment even though the description
read "equipment of all kinds, including equipment now owned by Debtor
and equipment hereafter acquired by debtor." The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit,5' took a similar view. It held that "all farm and other
equipment . . . now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor" was a
sufficient description in a security agreement.
Livestock can be farm products under some circumstances and inventory in others depending on who holds it; but regardless of its classification
under §9-109, there still remains the question of how detailed the description of livestock must be in security agreements and financing statements.
A description as vague as "all personal property" is clearly an inadequate
description to encompass livestock." But a security agreement describing
collateral as "twenty-four (24) head of Holstein heifers" was held not to
render a security agreement defective but did place a burden on the secured party to identify the particular heifers. 3 In United States v. Pirnie,4
a description of collateral in a security agreement as "all livestock now
45. People's Bank v. Pioneer Food Indus., Inc., 486 S.W.2d 24, 11 UCC REP. SEarv. 651
(Ark. 1972).
46. First Nat'l Bank v. Calvin Pickle Co., 11 UCC REP. SERV. 1245 (Okla. App. 1973).
47. 516 P.2d 265, 12 UCC REP. SERV. 943 (Okla. 1973).
48. 429 S.W.2d, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 11 (Ky. 1968).
49. In re Anselm, 344 F. Supp. 544, 11 UCC REP. SEarv. 397 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
50. Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 11 UCC REP. SERV. 843 (Del.
1972).
51. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 470 F.2d 944, 11 UCC REP. SERV. 1048 (8th Cir.
1973).
52. In re Fuqua, 461 F.2d 1186, 10 UCC REP. SERV. 936 (10th Cir. 1972).
53. United States v. Mid-State Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099, 10 UCC RzP. SERV. 703 (D.
Neb. 1971).
54. 339 F. Supp. 702, 10 UCC REP. SERV. 1264 (D. Neb. 1972).
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owned or hereafter acquired by the debtor" was held sufficient," Most
recently, in Peoples Bank v. Northwest GeorgiaBank, 6 the court held that
a description of collateral in a financing statement as "100 head of black
angus beef cattle" was sufficient to put interested parties on notice.
FIXTURES

Fixtures deserve brief mention with respect to the issue of description.
However, the knottiest problem, and one not within the scope of this
article, is determining whether an item is a "fixture" as opposed to a
movable good or as opposed to part of the realty itself. With respect to
description, the question is whether the realty to which it is attached is
adequately described, as required by §9-402. In ArchitecturalCabinet, Inc.
v. Manley,5 7 the court said a description of the real property by metes and
bounds was not necessary and that if "Crestmont Farms" was a specific
farm or estate, that designation of the locale where a fixture was installed
was sufficient. However, the Attorney General of Minnesota said that
when Torrens property was involved, the description must be specific,
unlike the situation when dealing with fixtures on abstract of title realty. '8
And in Home Savings Ass'n v. Southern Union Gas Co.,59 the indication
in a financing statement of the address of the debtor as such, although that
was the very address where the fixtures were located, was insufficient to
satisfy the identification requirements of §9-402. Not surprisingly, the
total absence of a description of the realty to which the fixture attached
was fatal to the perfection of a security interest in In re Shepard.60 Though
there is a paucity of decisions under the Code on the description of realty
in fixture situations, prudence dictates that the description include at least
a street, a number, a town, and a state.
SERIAL NUMBER CASES

The official comment to §9-110 urged courts to refuse to follow older
decisions that held descriptions inadequate unless they met the so-called
"serial number test." As has been seen, courts appear generally to have
heeded this suggestion when serial numbers were in fact not involved; but
what of the situation in which a serial number has been incorrectly recorded in a description of the collateral, whether in a financing statement
or in a security agreement?
55. To the same effect see Barth Brothers v. Billings, 227 N.W.2d 673, 17 UCC REP. SERV.
237 (Wis. 1975).
56. 19 UCC REP. SERV. 953 (Ga. App. 1976).
57. 3 UCC REP. SERV. 263, 17 Ches. Co. L. Rep. 71 (1966).
58. Opinion of the Attorney General of Minnesota, 3 UCC REP. SERV. 665 (1966).
59. 11 UCC REP. SERV. 639, (Tex. Ct. of C iv. App., 8th Dist. 1972).
60.

14 UCC REP. SERV. 249 (W.D. Va. 1974).
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The court in National-Dime Bank v. Cleveland Bros. Equipment Co."
held that an error in a serial number in the security agreement and financing statement did not negate the effectiveness of those two documents,
since the remainder of the description was sufficient to put an interested
party on notice. But when the balance of the description was insufficient,
an erroneous serial number was fatal to the security interest. 2 The court
in In re Esquire Produce Co., 3 held that'a description of a Ford Van
Econoline 6-Cylinder as a "1966 Ford" in a financing statement was adequate and not misleading even though a "5" was substituted for an "8" in
an 11-digit serial number. In Beneficial Finance Co. v.Kurland CadillacOldsmobile, Inc.," the court, while observing that there was no statutory
requirement to include a motor vehicle serial number in a financing statement, urged that New York either adopt a certificate of title or require that
financing statements include the serial number to reduce the opportunity
for deception. The philosophy of the court in Beneficial was echoed in Still
Associates v. Murphy 5 when the appellate division of the district courts
held that a one-digit error in a ten-digit motor vehicle serial number was
fatal to the description in the security agreement and financing statement.
The court held that pre-Code decisions such as Wise v. Kennedy,6" which
held serial number errors to be fatal were still the law despite §9-110, at
least when "valuable cars" were concerned. Upon review, however, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the decision of the
appellate division:
Section 9-402(5) provides in particular that "[a] financing statement
substantially complying with the requirements of this section is effective
even though it contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading."
If we apply the provision to the facts of this case consistently with "the
broad purposes of the act" . . . we are led to conclude that the validity
of the financing statement was not affected by the mistake in the last digit
of the serial number ...
2. It is implicit in this holding that Wise v. Kennedy, supra, is no
longer to be followed. This result is consistent with the Comment to GL
c. 106, §9-110 ....11
61.

1 UCC REP. SERY. 454, 74 Dauphin Co. Rep. 194, 20 Pa. D&D2d 511 (1959).
62. Yancey Bros. Co. v. Dehco, Inc., 108 Ga. App. 875, 134 S.E.2d 828, 2 UCC REP. SERV.
10 (1964). Although this case was decided under pre-Code law, the court appeared to be of
the opinion that the results would have been the same even if the Code applied.
63. 5 UCC REP. SERV. 257 (E.D. N.Y. 1968). On a humorous note, the referee pointed out
that the trustee himself made an error in describing the serial number in a memorandum
submitted to the referee.
64. 57 Misc.2d 806, 293 N.Y.S.2d 647, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 1033 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968).
65. 7 UCC REP. SERV. 560 (Mass. App. Div. 1970).
66. 248 Mass. 83, 142 N.E. 755 (1924).
67. Still Assoc. v. Murphy, 267 N.E.2d 217, 218-19, 8 UCC REP. SERv. 929, 930-31 (Mass.
1971). Accord, Bank of North America v. Bank of Nutley, 227 A.2d 535, 4 UCC REP. SERV.
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DESCRIPTION OF COLLATERAL

The omission of the serial numbers of two fork lifts, when the serial
numbers of seven fork lifts had been listed in an attachment to a financing
statement, was held in In re Aragon Industries, Inc."'not to give notice to
interested parties of the two fork lifts. The court said:
It is recognized that if no serial numbers had been used at all, perfection
of the security agreement perhaps would not be subject to attack ...
However, where a party does in fact make use of serial numbers in a
multiple item transaction, it runs the risk of subjecting its security interest to attack if it does so incorrectly. This follows from the real possibility
that the erroneous description will divert or "head off" appropriate inquiry in such cases.'
In a very recent decision, Adams v. Nuffer, 1' the court held that an error
in the serial number of a boat in a financing statement did not invalidate
the statement.
In summary, it appears that an error in a serial number will not render
ineffective a security interest, at least when there is an additional description of the physical collateral itself. The same is true if the serial number
is omitted entirely. Aragon, however, teaches us that if some serial numbers are listed and others are omitted, an otherwise enforceable security
interest in the "omitted" items may be negated.
CONCLUSION

At the outset of this article, the question was asked whether courts had
heeded the Code's admonition to test the sufficiency of description of
collateral by whether it made possible identificationrather than by imposing the "serial number test." While the reader is free to judge for himself,
I have concluded that courts generally have followed the recommendations
of the comments to §9-110 and have discarded the archaic and oft-unjust
tests of pre-Code years. But heeding the old saw, "an ounce of prevention
is worth a pound of cure," prudent counsel will draft security agreements
and financing statements to leave no doubt that, to borrow from Gertrude
Stein, "a rose is a rose is a rose."
56 (N.J. Super. 1967). Associates Capital Corp. v. Bank of Huntsville, 12 UCC REP. SERV.
186 (Ala. Ct. of Civ. App. 1973); Central National Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Bank &
Trust, 528 P.2d 710, 16 UCC REP. SERV. 244 (Okla. 1974).
68. 14 UCC REP. SERV. 1218 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
69. Id. at 1221-22.
70. 550 P.2d 181, 19 UCC REP. SERV. 939 (Utah 1976).

